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SUMMARY

It is likely that nuclear diffusion will prove destabilizing
if for no other reason than that it will present us with a novel
world , and one substantially less secure than the present world .
The acquisition of nuclear weapons may be expected to have a
sobering effect upon nations , but any increase of prudence may be
more than offset by the insecurity many nations will experience .
The impacr of the Nth country problem on stability will
depend largely upon the nature and quality of the weapons systems
Nth countries acquire . I n relati on to the maj-or powers , Nth
countries possessing a weapons s ystem entirely vulnerable to a
pre - emptive strike, or incapable of penetrating the active
defenses of a major power , would probably not enjoy a greater
degree of strategic independence and security than they do today .
An Nth country might become substantially more independent, however , if it were to possess a weapons system some small portion
of w~1ich could survive a pre - emptive strike and penetrate the
defenses even of a major adversar y .
It seems reasonably clear that the trigger value of nuclear
weapons will depend on the size of the trigger . Below a certain
size the trigger may well prove to be a liability rather than an
asset . Above a certain size and quality , the trigger may turn
into an asset of considerable significance .
Again, in relation to maj or powers , it is difficult to see
the advantage an Nth power would obtain by acquiring tactical
nuclear weapons , since in all probability the employment of such
weapons would be restricted to the territory of the Nth country .
iv

Nuclear diffusion is very likely to increase the incidence
of local conflicts between Nth countries . The only reasonable
assumption, it would app0ar, is that the possibility of major
power involve·nent in such conflicts will remain about the same
as Jt present . Considered in isolation, therefore, nuclear diffusion will have a strategically destabilizing effect since the
consequences of military instability at lower levels must
eventually be felt at the strategic level .

v

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Although there is a general consensus among the exocrt:s that
nuclear diffusion must prove destabilizing , there is consiJcraLle
variation of opinion on how destabilizing nuclear ditfusio, might
beo To a large extent , this va~iation of opinion may be attributed to the very different assumptions analysts have made --oiten
unconsciously--on such critical matters as: the military en\;iron ment in which nuclear diffusion might take place; the extent o(
nuclear diffusion as well as the speed and the evenness with
which it occurs; the size and quality of the weapons systems
eventually possessed by the smaller powers; and so on.
It will be readily apparent that it makes a great Jeal of
difference whether nuclear diffusion occurs with in a highly
unstable military envirorunent or whether it occurs within an
environment characterized by a very stable strat:egic relationship between the major nuclear powerso Similarly, the number of
countries obtaining nuclear weapons, the traditions and interests
of such countries , and the speed with which countries obtain
nuclear weapons could all be factors of critical importancco A
world of ten nuclear countries may pose new and difficult proL lems, but these problems may be very different from the problems
posed by a world of thirty nuclear nations . Nor would the
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Sweden necessarily have
the same consequences for stability as would the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by Egypt . And, if nations were to acquire
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nuclear weapons over a fairly extended period of time, a
measure of adjustment might be made that would prove impossible
if the time period for nuclear diffusion is telescoped .
Even more significant , perhaps, is the assumption one makes
about the nature of the weapons systems the smaller nations might
eventually possess (let us say within the next 10 to 20 years).
It is one thing to assume that the smaller nations would possess
only a very small number of low-yield weapons , together with a
delivery system limited to manned aircraft . It is quite another
matter to assume that nuclear and missile technology has so
advanced as to enable many of the small nations to acquire a
substantial number of high - yield weapons and a missile-delivery
system. Of course, all kinds of possibilities between these
two extremes may also be envisagedo
These observations should not be taken to imply that it is
pointless to discuss the possible effects of nuclear diffusion
from a rather general point of view and without making a large
number of fairly specific assumptions . The attempt to evaluate
the consequences of nuclear diffusion in terms of the variety of
circumstances in which it might conceivably occur is, at any
rate, hardly feasible since it resembles a game of almost limitless possibilities . Besides, many of the consequences expected
to follow from diffusion may not unreasonably be considered as
applying in varying degree to rather disparate circumstances.
At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that these consequences will apply in varying degree depending upon the more
specific conditions one assumes and that the degree to which
they are applicable must prove of critical importance to the
policy-maker .
In the following discussion, the principal arguments that
have been put forward on the expected consequences of nuclear
dif f usion are examined in terms of what this writer regards as
the more likely developments that might attend the process of
diffusiono No attempt is made to consider these arguments by
testing them in terms of a large number of possible circumstances.
Nor is the attempt made to portray a particular situation,
characterized by a number of rather specific features, and
then to consider the consequences of diffusion within the
prescribed framework. Obviously, the method that is pursued
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reflects a measure of bias, since it is consciously selecti ve .
Even so, some of the assumptions that are made should raise
little controversy . l

lo It should be emphasized that this paper is not addressed
to the problems arising from "nuclear sharing . TT Presumably,
nuclear sharing indicates a policy whereby a major nuclear power
ngivesTT nuclear weapons to an ally while retaining a veto right
over the use of the weapons . In other words, it Ttshares TT control
over the weapons with the recipient nation in the sense that both
giver and recipient must agree on the e~ployment of the weapons
before they can be used . There is a clear and decisive difference, then, between shared nuclear forces and independently controlled nuclear forces . It is equally clear that the consequences
resulting from these two kinds of diffusion must differ
considerably .
3

CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF NOVEL'IY, PRUDENCE, AND NUMBERS
NOVELTY AS A DESTABI LI ZI NG FACTOR
Among the general arguments stressing the destabilizing
effects of nuclear diffusion pe r haps the most significant argu ment emphasizes novelty as a destabilizing factor . In its
simplest form , it is the argument that novelty implies uncer tainty and , in consequence , instability . Thornton Read makes
this point as follows :
• • • a world made up of nuclear power s would be more
unfamiliar than our pre0ent wor ld ( which is unfamil iar enough ), more complex in its power relations ,
and hence more difficult to understand and deal with .
Our ability to handle m.'w situations is limited at
best . The more unfamiliar the situation , the greater
is the probability of serious failure . It has taken
years to gain what understanding we now have of
deterrence and stability in a bipolar nuclear world .
A world of many nuclear powers would present much
more complex probl2ms . n2
1

2 . Thornton
Princeton Center
Noo 22, 1960 , p .
1
two - power 1 case

Read , A Proposal to Neutralize Nuclear Weapons ,
of International Studies , Policy Memorandum
53 . Herman Kahn makes much the same point : nThe
seems both intellectually and practically more
4

It is difficult to deny the force of this argument,
general though it may be . To be sure , one may point to
novel developments that have not had a particularly destabi lizing effect on state relations . But on the whole, the
weight of experience seems clearly to point in the opposite
dir ection . And a world of many nuclear powers would be a
nover world , even as contrasted with the present world . I f
stability depends upon our ability to understand u.nd to con trol a given situation , it is only reasonable to conclude
t hat a complex and as yet obscure situation will be less
amenable to controlo
There is , in addition , the argument that nuclear diffusion
will lead to an ever increasing ob sessi on with nuclear weapons ,
a development that must prove destabilizing because of the
gre ater insecurity it is eventually bound to create . TI1e spread
of nuclear weapons , this argument c ontend s , is all too likely to
prove hyperbolic in character . With every increase in the nwn10r
of nuclear powers , the pressure on non - nuclear nations to u.cquirc
nuclear weapons will increase . In large measure, this pressure
will simply reflect consideration s of prestige and the sense of
"inferiority' attached to nonmembership in a club that has come
to include many of the middle range and some of the srnc:i.ller
powers . The possession of nuclear weapons will therefore come to
represent an increasingly important status symbol f or a large
number of the nations of the world . In part, however, this pres sure will also reflect strategic considerations . In this res pect ,
Paul Doty writes that "if a country can gain a nuclear capc:i.bility
that is significant in terms of the potential threat it faces , it
can be strategically justified in doing s o . 1 3 This threat need
controllable than the 'N - power 1 case . The diffusion of nuclear
weapons not only complicates the over - all 'analytic ' problem , but
the stakes at risk if events go badly would seem to be less in the
1
two - power 1 than in the 1 N- power 1 case . " 'The Arms Race and Some
of its Hazards , 11 Daedalus ( Fall , 1960 ), p . 778 .
3 . Paul Doty , TTThe Role of the Smaller Powers , " Daedalus
( Fall , 1960 ), p . 823 . Doty adds : " .-o while most of the smaller
powers do not have strategically valid reasons to justify nuclear
arming , the decision to do so by any of a number of individual
nations could trigger others into f ollowing suit , since the threat
pr esented by a nation with a few newly acquired nuclear arms is a
challenge they could dare to meet . "
5

not emanate from a maj or nuclear power but from one of the
smaller nuclear powers . Indeed , it is the possible threat
presented by a neighbor with a few newly acquired nuclear
weapons, and with whom one has a serious conflict of
interests, that may seem the more clearly to provide a strategic justification for acquiring nuclear weapons .
Whatever the particular complex of reasons, however, the
increasingly widespread possession of nucleur weapons will have
the general effect of aggravating the security problem nations
face . 4 For the spread of nuclear weapons will aJmost inevitably
result in an ever greater dependence upon these weapons and a
decreasing dependence and emphasis on conventional weapons. If
diffusion occurs largely by the independent efforts of the individual nations , unassisted by the major nuclear powers, it will
have to come through the diversion of resources now devoted to
conventional forces . Nations will probably be reluctant to support both types of forces and many of them simply cannot afford
to make the effort required to develop nuclear forces while
retaining adequate conventional forceso Besides, it is only to
be expected that the reaction to the acquisition of nuclear
weapons will be to place an exaggerated reliance upon these
weapons --at least for purely regional rivalries and conflicts--and
to de - emphasize the utility of conventional forces . Thus, even i f
the major nuclear powers were to transfer (not rt share") nuclear
weapons and delivery systems to their allies, the latter might
still be unwilling to continue to bear the burden of maintaining
adequate conventional forces .
The world will therefore move ever closer to a situation in
which the present confrontation of the two major nuclear powers
will be re - enacted on a more modest level between a number of
the smaller powers . Given an uneven spread of nuclear weapons-much the more likely development- - the temptation to resort to
preventive war against an adversary not yet in possession of
nuclear weapons is bound to arise . Given a fairly even spread of
nuclear weapons , though weapons whose vulnerability make them little more than first - strike forces, the temptation to remove an
4 . This statement, it should be noted , is not incompatible
with the possibility that a particular state may improve--at
least for a time- - its security by acquiring nuclear weapons . It
is the international system as a whole that the statement refers
to .
6

adversary through surprise attack may prove very greato And,
what may begin as a symmetrical spread of nuclear weapons may
nevertheless develop asymmetrical features . There is no reason
to believe that the fears that have haunted and that still haunt
the major nuclear powers will not prove equally oppressive to the
smaller countries in their relations with one another. If these
expectations are reasonable, the over - all consequence of nuclear
diffusion must be an ever greater insecurity productive of an
ever greater instability . Finally, and for reasons examined
below, the insecurity and instability that may breed nuclear conflicts a~ong the smaller powers will also hold out the prospect
of involving the major powers as well .
THE RELATION OF POWER TO PRUDENCE
It is of course apparent that the argument summarized above
draws its persuasive power from a number of assumptions that deserve
a morG careful scrutiny and that, in any event, cannot be regarded
as self - evident . Even so, none of the assumptions on which it
depends seems unreasonable. Occasionally, it has been pointed out
that this general argument neglects the possibility that the
acquisition of nuclear weapons will be a sobering experience for
the smaller powers and will have the effect of making these
nations more prudent . But this objection largely misses the real
point of the argument . Even if it is assumed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a sobering effect upon the possessors, the relevant question is not whether nations may become
so;newl1at more prudent but whether they will resist the compulsions
or the nnecessity" under which they may come to believe they must
act . Given the all too possible circumstances that may characterize the relations of a number of smaller powers during a period
of nuclear diffusion, it may seem very imprudent--from the point
of view of the interests of a smaller power5--not to use nuclear
weapons .
Besides, although the acquisition of nuclear weapons may
have the general effect of making nations more prudent, it must
So And in this respect, it is difficult to consider the prudential qJality of the actions of a smaller nation save from the
point of view of the interests of that nation--not the interests
of an alliance and even less the interests of international
society as a whole .
7

be admitted that we have very little ex perience to go on in this
respecto What experience we do have is limited to the major
powers and is by no means unambiguous . Whether this experience-itself not free from ambiguity - -would be repeated by the smaller
powers in terms of their immediate rivalries is at the very least
open to serious doubt . And the temptations nuclear weapons may
hold out to some of the smaller nations to nresolven a conflict
with a neighbor not yet in possession of these weapons may· still
overcome whatever increase in prudence that otherwise results
from the possession of nuclear weapons .
For the most part , however, the question of prudence or--as
some writers prefer to put the matter --of nresponsibilityn has
been used as a further argument on behalf of the position that
nuclear diffusion must prove destabilizing . This argument has
taken a number of forms . Perhaps the most common form, and certainly the simplest, is the assertion that by definition the
great powers are also the great nresponsiblesn and the smaller
powers are somehow less responsible . Responsibility is there fore held to be by some mysterious process directly proportional
to po·v>Jer . 6 A more nsophisticated n version of this argument
declares that the great powers --meaning of course the present
great nuclear powers7- - are the more responsible because they have
the most to lose if nuclear weapons are used . Smaller nations ,
unhampered by the burdens shouldered by the great nuclear powers,
may--and probably would --be tempted to employ nuclear weapons
under trivial provocation . Finally , there is the rather novel
suggestion that the more technologically advanced and complex a
society, the more likely is it to have a leadership that is
rational and, we may assume, responsible in issues of war and
peace which involve perhaps the nation 1 s very existence .
60 Prejudices change . I n the interwar period almost the
reverse belief was taken as self - evident by the majority of
writers . Small powers were not only the more virtuous but also
the more responsible . Purely as a personal choice , I still find
the earlier belief pre f erable . At lea st it had the merit of
refusing to equate power with responsibility ( and by implication
with virtue as well ).

7 . This in order to exclude China from the category of the
ngreat responsibles . u
8

There is no reason, however, to assume that prudence or
responsibility is somehow directly proportional to power. The
great powers--specifically the present great nuclear powers--are
not by definition more responsible than the smaller powers. Nor
are the great powers the more responsible because they have more
to lose through a nuclear conflict which may eventually engulf
them~
At any rate, the question who has the most to lose cannot
be meaningfully answered in quantitative terms. If it is to prove
relevant at all, it must be asked and answered in qualitative
terms. In this sense, the smaller powers surely have as much to
lose as the major powers; i.e., their national existence. On this
issue they may be expected--as a general rule--to be as prudent
and therefore as responsible as the major nuclear powers. It is,
of course, quite true that prudence and responsibility with respect to the new weaponry depends, at least in large part, upon a
sophistication that can come only from a knowledge of and an
experience with these weapons. No one would view with equanimity
the sudden possession of a few atomic weapons by the Congolese.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is little reason to
assume that the leadership of Sweden, Belgium, or Switzerland
would be less responsible in issues of war and peace if these
nations were to possess nuclear weapons. In the case of such
nations as Egypt, it is not at all clear whether the possession
of nuclear weapons would heighten the probability of nuclear conflict because of an expectation that the type of leadership
characteristic of such countries as Egypt would act imprudently
and irresponsibly.
On occasion, however, the term responsible has been employed
to describe a certain kind of weapons system rather than--or in
addition to--the policy governing the use of those weapons. Thus
Albert Wohlstetter speaks of a nresponsible deterrentn as one
that is protected from a first strike and that has successfully
met the problems of corrunand and control.8 In this sense, responsibility implies a weapons system that avoids automaticity of
8. Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+l
Country," Foreign Affairs (April, 1961) p o 362. Wohlstetter also
uses the term responsible to indicate a defensive, as distinguished
from an aggressive, policyo In this latter sense, he identifies
responsibility with an ninterest in deterrence rather than in
aggressionon It should be clear, however, that a nation may
possess a nresponsible deterrentn and still pursue a policy that
is very irresponsible--and aggressive.
9

response as well as decentralization of decision. Of course,
such a weapons system affords no guarantee that the nation
possessing it will act responsibly or prudently. But it does
provide the most favorable circumstances for responsible
behavior; i.e., it permits one to be prudent. The merit of this
particular argument, then, is to emphasize that prudent behavior
is in substantial measure dependent not simply upon will or
intent, but upon the objective circumstances in which nations
must act. To the extent that the smaller nations are unable to
fashion a "responsible deterrent," in the meaning indicated
above, the prudent or responsible use of nuclear weapons may
become exceedingly difficult. And in this specific sense, though
only in this sense, there is a justification for equating power
with responsibility.
THE nsTATISTICAL" ARGUMENT
It is a very different matter to argue that the greater the
number of nations--large and small--possessing nuclear weapons,
the greater the chance that nuclear conflict may arise as a consequence of irresponsible action. The question at issue here is
not whether great powers are somehow more responsible than small
powers but whether the danger of irresponsible behavior simply
increases with an increase in the number of nations that have the
capability--specifically, the nuclear capability--of behaving
irresponsibly. The argument, then, is TTstatistical" in ~haracter.
It simply asserts that since there is always a possibility that
the leadership of a nation--any nation--may behave in an irresponsible manner, the possib;Llity that nuclear conflict may arise
through irresponsible behavi6r must increase as the number. of
nations possessing nuclear weapons increases.
The nstatistical" argument, discussed above in connection
with the problem of irresponsible action, may of course be
generalized by applying it to almost all of the possible ways by
which nuclear conflict could ariseo ~ost writers, in discussing
the Nth nation problem, have not drawn the full consequences from
the statistical argument. Even Ikl~, who has sought more carefully than others to articulate the statistical theory, writes:
TTAccording to the tstatistical theoryt the
probability of a global thermonuclear war increases
as the number of nuclear powers increases, because
(a) the larger the number of these powers, the
greater the probability that nuclear weapons will
10

be us ed in s ome c onflict ( both because of more
opportunities and a greater chance of irresponsibility); and ( b ) if nuclea r weapons are used in a
conflict , the risk of its expanding into a global
war is gr eater than if the conflict remained nonnuclear • 1' 9
But the "statistical theory" may be and perhaps should be
put in even br oader terms . I t applies to the problem of accidental war, as well as to the problem of war arising from mis calculation or the misinterpretation of an adversary's intentions . It also applies to the danger of ''catalytic war . nlO In
a word, almost any of the causes that might lead to nuclear
conf lict - -whether a local nuclear conflict or a global thermonuclear conflict --may be regarded as representing a statistical
probability and therefore falling within the terms of the argument, as it is broadly ~onceived above . 11
Whether , and to what extent, the "statistical theory" is
relevant to the Nth country problem cannot be determined in the
abstract. If it is assumed that despite the spread of nuclear
weapons nations will continue to behave in much the same way as
they now behave, that they will manifest the same degree of prudence or the lack thereof, that they will continue to have the
same fears and the same aspirations , and that they will still be
prone to miscalculate with about the same frequency as in the
past - -in short, if it is assumed that all else remains the same
1

9 . Fred C. Ikle, "Nth Countries & Disarmament," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists ( December , 1960), p . 391.
1

lOo Ikle , for example , separates the "statistical theoryn
from the "catalytic war theory,'' as do most other writers who
discuss the Nth nation problem . But the "catalytic war theory,n
to the extent that it merits serious consideration at all, is
itself a statistical problem--at least in part .
11 . Wohls tetter ( Op . cit., p . 371 ) makes this point with
respect to the heightened probability of war by "mistaken
likely to result from nuclear diffusion. Thus: nEven if, with
large-scale proliferation, each new nuclear power adopted a
positive control system with a high standard of responsibility,
there would be an increase in the possibility of mistakes,
simply because there would be more control centers.,"
11

as before save that more and more nations have acquired nuclear
weapons , then the case for the statistical theory seems very
strong indeed . To accept this assumption, however, is to avoid
or to beg most of the specific problems that are raised by
nuclear diffusion . It must be expected that with the spread of
nuclear weapons new forces and new pressures will become operat ive . If these forces should tend , on balance, to increase instability , then the increased possibility of conflict--whether local
or global--is not merely the result of the nstatistical theorytt
but of these novel forces as well . If , on the other hand, the
forces set in operation by the spread of nuclear weapons tend, on
balance , to increase stability , then despite the nstatistical
theoryn the possibility of nuclear conf lict--whether regional or
gl obal --might diminish or at least not increase . A meaningful
judgment on the significance of the statistical theory to the Nth
country problem cannot be made without a more detailed examinati on of the specific problems resulting from nuclear diffusion .
At best , it can follow such an analysis and not precede - -or merely
bypass -- ita
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CHAPTER III
THE RELATION OF NTH POWERS TO THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS
In examining the more specific discussions of the effects of
nuclear diffusion , and the degree to which these effects may prove
destabilizing, it is useful to distinguish the possible impact of
diffusion on the relations of Nth powers towards each other and on
the relations of Nth powers to the major nuclear powers . 12
With respect to the relations of Nth powers to the major
nuclear powers , it has been argued that nuclear diffusion must
pr ove destabilizing for the reason that nations acquiring nuclear
weapons either would actually be in a more independent position
t han before or would at least feel that they enjoyed a greater
degree of independence . According to this argument , nuclear
diffusion may therefore be expected to have a disruptive effect on
t he cohesiveness and unity of the major alliance systems - -particul arly the Western alliance system . The smaller nations acquiring
12 . Strictly speaking, the term "Nth powern suggests the last
state to achieve nuclear weapons . I n the following discussion ,
however, the term is used--rather loosely- - to indicate any nation
(Ch i na and Germany excepted ) that might acquire nuclear weapons
in the near future . The term therefore refers both to the smaller
and to the middle powers . Obviously , China is a case apart and
deserves separate consideration . Probably the same should be
said f or Germany . But apart from these two special cases , not
specifically dealt with in this paper , the distinctions that are
drawn in the succeeding pages should be reasonably clear .
13

nuclear weapons will generally prove more difficult to control.
In terms of the international system as a whole, nuclear diffusion
will militate against bipolarity .
It is worth noting that this argument cannot be dismissed
simply by demonstrating that nations acquiring only a very modest
nuclear capability will not in fact be less dependent upon the
support and protection of a major nuclear ally in resisting the
pressures of another major nuclear power. Even if this is true,
nuclear diffusion may nevertheless prove politically destabilizing
if those nations acquiring nuclear weapons insist upon believing
that these weapons do give them a more independent position . Nor
does it seem unlikely that a number of them would believe--at least
for a time- - that even a token nuclear capability could have the
effect of rendering them less vulnerable to the blandishments of
a major nuclear power ( or its allies ).
Among those who dismiss the argument that a nuclear arse~al
wi l l in fact serve as a means for becoming independent- - or at
least substantially more independent- - of big-power tutelage,
Henry Kissinger writes : "A major nuclear power , confronted by an
Nth country not backed by another major nuclear power, could
always strike pre - emptively . Thus Nth countries would continue
to be dependent on the support of a major nuclear power . By the
same token, the danger in the proliferation of national nuclear
establishments is that it may enable some Nth countries - -and particularly Communist China -- to commit their more powerful allies
to nuclear war . ''13
Kissingerts argument is simply that in view of the nuclear
f orce any Nth power (China excepted ) can be ·ceasonably expected
t o have in the next decade or so , it could not expect to reduce
significantly- -much less to elirninate --the retaliatory forces of
a major nuclear power by a preventive or a pre-emptive strike .
On the other hand, to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against
a major nuclear power might well provoke the latter to a pre emptive strike, which would even more decisively seal the fate
of the smaller power . In view of this, Kissinger concludes ,
nuclear weapons probably would not improve the strategic posi tion of the Nth country vis-a-vis the major nuclear power . What
nuclear weapons might do is give Nth countries allied to a major
nuclear power an added leverage by virtue of an ability t o commit

13 . Henry Kissinger , The Necessity for Choice ( 1961 ) , p . 42 .
14

the major power to nuclear war. But even this "nuisance value" of
nuclear weapons may boomerang against the smaller power, since
a major power convinced of the unreliability of a smaller ally
may seek, particularly at a critical moment, to dissociate itself
from the actions of its ally.
It will be apparent that the strength of this position
largely depends on the nature of the weapons system that it is
assumed Nth powers might possess. If, for example, the weapons
a smaller power might acquire could easily be destroyed through
a pre-emptive strike by a major power, or if the active air
defenses of a major power could easily destroy the modest forces
a smaller power might launch (whether pre-emptively or in retaliation), then clearly it would be folly for a smaller power to
believe that its nuclear weapons gave it a greater degree of
strategic independence and security.14 On the contrary, in
relation to its great adversary it would, if anything, be less
secure. For the very fact that it possesses some nuclear weapons
would serve to make it a "legitimate" object of nuclear blackmail
by a major power in a way that it is not a legitimate object so
long as it does not possess any nuclear weapons.IS Nor does it

14. Of course, it still may be argued that if almost any
nuclear weapons give a nation a ~riggering capability, then the
possession of such weapons would enhance its security. Although
a great power could destroy the smaller country's forces by a
pre-emptive attack it would refrain from doing so for fear of
sparking a global thermonuclear war. Even more, a great power
would--accordjng to this reasoning--presumably refrain from
seriously threatening the smaller country for fear that such
action would provoke a desperate reaction on its part, thus
triggering a global thermonuclear war. For reasons indicated
below, it seems doubtful that this reasoning is valid.
15. Some readers may question this point. Yet experience to
date would seem to bear it out. There is a very distinct liability
incurred--politically and propaganda wise--in threatening nuclear
action against a nation that does not possess nuclear weapons which
is not incurred in nearly the same degree when the threat of
nuclear action is directed against a nuclear power. The Soviets
have not been unaware of this consideration, as may be seen in
their reluctance to date to use nuclear blackmail against nations
that neither possess nuclear weapons nor entertain the nuclear
forces of an ally.
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seem reasonable to assume that if the smaller power is allied to
a major power the latter would somehow be more willing or even as
willing as heretofore to counter the nuclear blackmail of the
other major power. The very fact that the smaller power has
acquired nuclear weapons may very likely reflect a desire to gain
a greater measure of independence from its major ally. It is
unreasonable to expect that in these circumstances the major ally
will nevertheless extend even further--at least in terms of the
potential risk--the commitment it made at a time when the minor
ally did not possess any nuclear weapons and was more amenable to
the control of its major partner. And if the smaller power indicates in any way that it is unreliable and may act irresponsibly
(ioe., irresponsibly from the point of view of the major power),
the major power can be expected to cut down rather than to extend
the scope of its commitmento
Nor is this all. Given a nuclear weapons system that may be
destroyed either by a pre-emptive strike or by the active defenses
of a major power, there is little reason to assume that a major
power intent on applying pressures -other than the threat of nuclear
blackmail would be particularly deterred by the fact that the victim possessed such a forceol6 It is difficult to see how such a
force could be employed to deter subversion and related measures.
It is almost equally difficult to see how the possession of such
a force could serve to deter an attack undertaken only by conventional forces, or if the smaller power mistakenly believes that
its nuclear weapons permit it to reduce its conventional forces,
the danger of local aggression undertaken by conventional arms
alone may even increase.
160 The argument adopted here must be considered with care.
The point is not that major powers will feel free to employ
limited force because of a conviction that a limited use of force
can be kept limited and will not prove destabilizing at the strategic level. It is simply that a very small and inadequate nuclear
force will not of itself deter a major power from action that it
would otherwise take; ioeo, take against a nation that did not
possess such a force. Indeed, it is argued below that the possession of such a force might well encourage the major power to apply
pressure on a smaller nation, if the effect of the latter's acquisition of nuclear weapons is to make its major ally more cautious
about getting committed to its defense.
16

To be sure, there remains the possibility that a major
power otherwise intent on aggression might be wary of provoking
a conventional conflict with a minor nuclear power allied to a
major power for fear that a desperate reaction by the minor
power in using its nuclear weapons might precipitate a thermonuclear conflict with its principal ally. But against this possibility must be balanced the prospect that the major power
allied to the potential victim will ·only be too we1i aware of
this danger, and consequently, may be ready to dissociate i tself
from the initial use of nuclear weapons by its smaller ally. The
willingness of a major power to extend nuclear deterrence to
allies is limited enough even when those allies do not possess
nuclear weapons and cannot themselves provoke a nuclear conflict
or transform a convent i onal conflict into a nuclear conflict.
Finally, in the event of a thermonuclear conflict between the
great powers, a minor nuclear power allied to one of the major
powers must expect the worst. There is at least the possibility
that if the ally possesses no nuclear weapons, i t may escape
direct assault during a thermonuclear exchange of the mighty.
But if it does possess such weapons, it can expect to be included
in the exchange almost as a matter of course.
In sum, with respect to an Nth power's relationships .to
major nuclear powers, a very low-class apprenticeship in the
nuclear club would seem to impose a number of liabilities and
to confer almost no benefits. On the other hand, if it is
assumed that the weapons systems Nth powers might eventually
possess would be of such a nature as to enable some _portion of
them to survive a pre-emptive strike by a major power, then the
picture could change quite considerably. Let us assume that an
Nth country, presently allied to the United States, were to possess a weapons system of such a nature that in the event of a
pre-emptive attack by the Soviets, it would still be left with
enough weapons to devastate several Soviet cities. To be sure,
it can be argued that a capability of this kind might al so provide a standing temptation to the Soviets to undertake a preventive or a pre-emptive strike. Still, this argument seems
rather strained and farfetched. Apart f rQm a global thermonucl ear
war, the Soviets would be tempted to undertake a pre-emptive str i ke
only if they were convinced that the Nth power was preparing to do
the sa11e. A strike "out of the blue" by the Nth power, f or whatever reason, is of course always possible. But surely it is a n
extremely remote possibility, since whatever damage i t might do
to t he adversary it must expect complete destruction in t ur n .
A somewhat more likely circumstance in which the Soviets might
be tempted to undertake a pre-emptive strike would be in a
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situation of very high tension, or even of conventional hostilities, between the Soviets--or a Soviet ally--and the Nth country.
Even in this situation, however, the probability that the Nth
country would attempt a pre-emptive strike, thereby insuring its
own annihilation, would seem rather small, and the Soviets may be
expected to realize this. Of course, if the Nth country were
placed in a clearly desperate situation of having to choose
between complete surrender and occupation, on the one hand, and
undertaking a pre-emptive strike, on the other hand, it might
choose the latter alternative, even though it would involve the
nation's physical annihilation. Here again, though, a major
adversary would surely be aware of this danger and would presumably take care to avoid deliberately placing the enemy in so
desperate a plight. And it would avoid doing so not only because
of the possibility that the Nth country's major ally might intervene. This last danger would seem appreciably greater, given a
substantial nuclear capability of an Nth power. The very fact
that the latter is able to provoke a significant nuclear exchange
with its adversary heightens the danger that the Nth powerts
major ally will eventually be drawn in. And this is only to say
that the ability of an Nth power to commit its more powerful ally
to nuclear war i s probably roughly pr·oportionate to the nuclear
strength of the Nth power.17
The above remarks suggest the conclusion that, in relation to
the major nuclear powers, the degree of strategic independence and
of security an Nth power might possess would depend upon its
power to inf lict damage upon a major adversary-- particularly its
second-strike capability. To this extent, Kissinger's previously
noted argument partly misses the point. Of course, "a major
nuclear power, confronted by an Nth power not backed by another
major nuclear power, could always strike pre-emptively.n But
against an Nth power capable of devastating in a second strike
several cities of the major power, there will be very little

17. There is the further consideration that the recipient of
the Nth power attack might fear--and perhaps with good reason--that
its major adversary that has until now stood aside might find this
moment opportune for launching a preventive strike, and in order to
prevent this, might launch what it considers to be a pre-emptive
strike. Then, too, the major ally that has so far remained inactive
will not be unaware of the fear entertained by its opponent and may
thu s be tempted to launch what it considers to be no more than a
pre-emptive strike.
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temptation even to threaten pre-emptiono Nor is it true to say
that the Nth country would continue to be as dependent on the
support of its major nuclear ally, for the Nth power's dependence on its major ally is obviously no more than a function of
the pressures brought against it and the consequent insecurity
it experiences. Given a diminution of those pressures, the
dependence of the Nth power is also bound to decrease.
Thus, a certain type of nuclear arsenal under national control is likely to serve as a means for becoming much more independent of big-power tutelage. Even more, if it is true that
the ability of an Nth power to commit a major ally to nuclear
war is roughly proportional to the nuclear strength of the Nth
power, we have the rather paradoxical result that the greater
the nuclear capability of an Nth country ally, the better are its
chances to weather successfully the "crisis of extended deterrence" during a period in which the increasing invulnerability
of the strategic forces of the major nuclear powers will cause
them to be increasingly reluctant to extend nuclear deterrence
to their allies. And if this reasoning is at all sound, Nth
powers--and particularly the larger among them--will have a
powerful incentive to acquire as effective a nuclear weapons
system as their capabilities permit.
Viewing nuclear capability as a sliding scale, then,
there is a point below which the acquisition of nuclear weapons
would not strengthen an Nth country's strategic independence and
security in relation to the major nuclear powers. If anything,
a nuclear capability falling short of this point would have the
opposite effect. Above this point, however, nuclear weapons
would give substantially greater independence and security and
would continue to do so in ever greater degree as one moved
still further up the scale. The chief difficulty, of course,
is in identifying the dividing point on the scale with some
degree of precision. Here, it is suggested that this point is
reached when an Nth power has forces capable of surviving a first
strike in sufficient measure to retaliate by striking at several
cities of the major power.
There remains the possibility, urged by some writers, that
small powers might desire to acquire a force of low-yield nuclear
weapons in the hope that this might deter a great power from
employing tactical nuclear weapons should it ever resort to force
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in the region of such minor po~rs.18 It is clear, however, that
effective deterrence in this instance would necessarily depend
upon the possession by the minorpower, or powers, of a rather substantial supply of tactical nuclear weapons. But from the point
of view of the small power, what purpose would be served by the
possession of such weapons? As long as a major power can achieve
its ends without introducing tactical nuclear weapons, it will be
to its interest to refrain from crossing the nuclear threshhold.
These weapons cannot serve as an effective deterrent either to a
conventional attack or to a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Against
a conventional attack their initiation in the area of the small
country might only serve to insure its annihilation. The major
power is therefore not likely to be effectively deterred fran
employing its conventional forces, since it will be aware of the
reluctance of the small country to introduce the use of tactical
nuclear weapons save in the last extremity. Against a pre-emptive
nuclear strike tactical nuclear weapons are no deterrent, since
they are intended for use on the battlefield and therefore presumably cannot be employed to strike at the cities of a ~ajor
power. Nor would they seem as effective as the weapons systems
considered earlier in raising the possibility that their employment would provoke a global thermonuclear war. And it is upon
this possibility, it should once again be emphasized, that the
deterrent value of Nth power nuclear forces in relation to the
great powers will largely rest.

18. See, for example, the discussion of Arthur Lee Burns,
Two Essays on Deter·rence, Tempo (December, 1960), Part I. 11 Stability Problems of Strategic Deterrent Systems." Burns suggests
(p. 6) that "a number of small atomic powers--a 'junior nuclear
club'--might deter great nuclear powers from using tactical
nuclear force in regions populated by 'junior club' members."
A commitment of this kind, however, presupposes a very high
degree of political unity. And even if it could deter the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, could it provide effective
deterrence against anything else (i.e., the use of conventional
forces on the one extreme and large thermonucle~r weapons on the
other extreme.)?
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CHAPI'ER IV
THE PROBLEM OF "CATALYTIC WAR"
The problem of "catalytic war" does not so much involve the
relations of Nth powers to the major nuclear powers as it does the
possible impact of Nth powers on the mutual relations of the major
nuclear powerso In brie f , the ncatalytic war" theory holds that
an Nth country might deliberately precipitate or catalyze a war
between the major nuclear powers "through the simulation of an
attack by one of the major powers against the other.nl9 Once a
rather fashionable theory, the danger of catalytic war (or at
least t h is particular "catalytic war 11 theory) is now largely discounted by analysts of the Nth nation problem. In order for a
catalytic war strategy, as defined above, to hold out the promise
of success, it is of course essential that the source of the
attack remain obscure, not only to the attacked nation but to its
major opponent as well. (The latter nation must in any event be
expected immediately to disavow responsiblity for the attack.)
Even if the source of the attack should remain obscure, however,
the scope of the attack would have to be quite considerable in
order to persuade the attacked nation that its major adversary
had launched a preventive strike. It may be doubted whether many
Nth countries will possess the forces required to persuade the
attacked nation of this. There is, to be sure, always the possibility that the attacked nation will react almost instantaneously

,

19. Ikle (op. cit., p. 392) has discussed various weaknesses
of this theory.
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and without waiting either to ascertain the scope of the attack
or to determine its source. Whether it would so behave must
depend very largely upon the degree to which its strategic forces
are invulnerable. If these forces are relatively invulnerable
and if the reaction time of the major power's command and control
system can provide for such contingencies, it does not seem
likely that it would respond to a catalytic war strategy by
immediately attacking its major nuclear opponent.20
In view of the risks a catalytic war strategy would entail
for an Nth power, it is difficult to see what motives could prompt
it to embark on such a hazardous course of actiono There is
always the risk that it might fail to provoke a thermonuclear
exchange between the great powers. If it does fail to achieve
this result, the chances are good that it will be found out and
subjected to the expected consequenceso And even if it did succeed in provoking a thermonuclear war between the great powers,
it might not survive this conflict. Indeed, there is strong
reason to believe that it would not survive. Although the
attacked nation might not know the real source of the initial
strike, it would presumably know that the Nth power does possess
nuclear weapons. Such possession is itself sufficient reason to
attack the Nth power once the major powers have come to gripso
The idea that an Nth power might nevertheless accept these risks
in order to achieve some vital interest (e.g., national unification) surely cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. Even so, it
appears rather strained and unlikely.
Quite different from the catalytic war theory discussed above
is the argument that an Nth country engaged in a conventional conflict in which it is steadily losing, might in desperation launch
a nuclear strike either against a major-power adversary or an ally
of the major power and thereby provoke a global thermonuclear war.
In this instance, some writers prefer to speak of nuclear conflict
through "escalation" rather than "catalysis." Both descriptions
are correct. The conflict has escalated into an all-out nuclear
20. If, on the other hand, the strategic forces of the major
powers were to remain highly vulnerable and geared to a very close
reaction time, the danger of catalytic war might be a serious one.
The attacked nation might well feel that it had no choice but to
respond immediately by attacking its major adversary. Then, too,
there is the added danger that the other major power might feel
compelled to initiate a pre-emptive strike precisely for the
reason that it could not take the risk of waiting to see how the
attacked nation would respond.
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exchange. At the same time, the decisive element in this escalating process may be the action of the Nth power, in which case
it plays the role of catalytic agent in the process.21
The differences between a catalytic war of this latter type
and a catalytic war of the former type are fairly clear. Whereas
in the former type the entire rationale of the action hinges on
not being found out, in the latter type there is no question
about the source of the initial nuclear strike. The circumstances
in which either type might occur, therefore, are quite different.
In the one, the ideal circumstance is a period of high tension in
the relations between the major powers, though not involving--at
least not directly involving--the Nth power. In the other, the
most likely circumstance is that of an armed conflict of a conventional character (it might also take the form of a civil war)
in which the Nth power is steadily losing out (either to a major
power directly or, more likely, to an ally of the major power).
The hope informing the one type is that the Nth power might somehow turn the trick and provoke an exchange between the giants
while itself remaining relatively unscathedo The desperation
in forming the other type is manifested by an act which is taken
with an awareness that its conseqJence will very probably entail
annihilationo If the latter type of catalytic war holds out a
hope to an Nth power, it cannot be fulfilled by the catalytic
action itself, but if at all, only by the effectiveness of the
threat to take such action, which is in turn a function of the
probability that the action if once taken would in fact provoke
a global thermonuclear war.
The essential problem raised by the latter type of catalytic
war theory therefore concerns the relationship that might be
expected between local wars involving at least one Nth power and
the risk of global war arising from such local conflicts. In part,
the answer to this problem m~st depend on the frequency with which
local conflicts involving Nth powers might be expected to occur.

21. Herman Kahn comes close to the point of view adopted above
when he writes: "One may wish to broaden the definition of catalytic war. Any method by which a nation uses military or diplomatic
power to embroil larger nations or increase the scope of the conflict could be called catalytic.n Op. cit., p. 764. For all
practical purposes, this may be interpreted to mean raising the
level and scope of violence; i.e., what most writers have called
"escalation.n
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The impact of the spread of nuclear weapons on the relations of
Nth powers, and the incidence of local conflicts, will be con sidered in the following section. Here it is sufficient to note
that the principal conclusion suggested in the following section
is that the impact of the spread of nuclear weapons on the relations of Nth powers to each other, and to nations not yet in
posse~sion of nu2lear weapons , is very likely to be severely
destabilizing . Hence, the prospects are that nuclear diffusion
will be attended by an increase in the number of local conflicts .
It is further suggested that along with an increase in the number
of 102al conflicts will go an increase in the possibility of major power involvement . In part, the answer to the problem posed above
has already been suggested in the preceding section . There it was
pointed out that, although any resort to force directly or indi rectly involving a major power is likely to prove destabilizing
at the strategic level, the degree to which the initiation of
nuclear weapons by an Nth power in a local conflict would prove
destabilizing at the strategic level depends very largely upon
the size and quality of the nuclear forces· at the disposal of
the Nth power .
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CHAPI'ER V
THE RELATION OF NTH COUNTRIES TO EACH OTHER
The effect of the spread of nuclear weapons on the
relations of Nth countries to each other would appear to
be as follows . Assuming that nuclear diffusion occurs in
a very uneven manner, and the chances are that this will be
the case, a number of the nations acquiring nuclear weapons
may be expected to use their newly gained advantage to resolve
any serious conflicts of interest in their favor. The impetus
to do so will be particularly strong if it is apparent that
this advantage is only very temporary . Nor will it be neces sary in a substantial number of cases to possess anything but
the most modest of weapons systems, for there are many small
countries which are for all practical purposes identified with
their capitals . To destroy the capital is in effect to destroy
the nation .
Even though it is almost precluded that nuclear diffusion
will generally proceed in a symmetrical fashion, it is possible
that two rival Nth nations might acquire nuclear weapons at
approximately the same capabilities . In this case, some writers
believe that extreme instability will stem from a different
reason; i . e . , the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons . Thus
Henry Kissinger has written : "None of the smaller countries will
have the resources to create much more than a rudimentary firststrike force . The elabbrate combination of warning, hardening,
and mobility needed to survive a surprise attack seems beyond
their capability •••• in order to safeguard their hard - won nuclear
25

capabilities, Nth countries will find themselves under nearly
irresistible pressure to launch a surprise attack.n22
This is perhaps too simple though. Some Nth countries will
be able to create relatively invulnerable forces in relation to
the kind of attack that could be made by another Nth country.
Beside s, if we assume symmetry in the nuclear c&pabilities of two
Nth countries, the nation unde~taking the surprise attack may-and probabl y woul d--have to choose between destroying the nuclear
forces of the adversary or destroying his cities. The former
alt ernative might require it to expend all its forces, and then
with no certainty of complete success, whereas the latter alternat ive would obviousl y leave it exposed to certain retaliation. To
make t hese qualifications is not to deny that a symmetrical spread
of nuclear weapons would give rise to considerable instability
between Nth powers and that this instability would stem primarily
from a mutual fear of surprise attack. It is only to point out
that the . ins t abilit y resulting from a fear of surprise attack,
and consequently the pressure to launch a surprise attack, would
probably not prove quite as great as commonly supposed because of
the inhibitions that may be expected to operate on Nth countries.
Aft er all, unless it is assumed that America is quite unique in
her virtue and the Soviet Union quite unique in her prudence, we
already have a historical model of sorts that might be applied-with appropriate modifications, of course--to at least some of
the Nth countries.
Even so, the position that as among Nth countries generally
the spread of nuclear weapons will give rise to increased instability, and a greater prospect not only of conflict but of nuclear
conflict, does appear very persuasive. And if conflicts among Nth
countries are more likely, it seems plausible to conclude that
this consequence will have a destabilizing effect on the strategic
relationship of the major powers, thus increasing the possibility
of central thermonuclear war over what it would otherwise be in
the absence of nuclear diffusion. The significance of the qualification should be apparent. It may well be--and probably is-true that if the major powers eventually acquire highly invulnerable forces and largely resolve the other problems on which
strategic stability is dependent, the spread of nuclear weapons
will not create an environment characterized by less strategic
stability than we possess today. This is only to say that the
destabilizing effects of nuclear diffusion at the strategic level
will probably not outweigh the stabilizing effects of the measures
the major powers are presently taking. Hence a future world in
22.

Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 244-45.
26

which there are many nuclear powers may still be a more
world in terms of the prospects of global thermonuclear
than is the present world. But it is also likely to be
less stable world than it would otherwise be if nuclear
could somehow be prevented.

stable
war
a much
diffusion

The above corrunents may be questioned, however, on the ground
that they simply assume the likelihood of major power involvement
in local conflicts. But even if it is granted that nuclear diffision will create circumstances more conducive to local conflict
it still does not follow that the major powers will necessarily
be involved in these conflicts. On the contrary, it has been
argued that "the diffusion of nuclear capabilities might make the
involvement of major powers in local conflicts appear to be more
risky and hence render it less likely.n23
In reply to this argument, the following points may be made.
A clear separation must be drawn between the likelihood of local
conflicts initiated or instigated by a major power against an Nth
country and the likelihood of local conflicts between Nth countries
which occur independently of and perhaps even in spite of the wishes
of the major powers. It is not necessary to contend that the incidence of the former type of local conflict will probably increase
in a period of nuclear diffusion. It is possible that this type
of conflict will even become less likely, though it is difficult
to make out a very persuasive case in support of this conclusion.
At any rate, the critical point here is whether there will be an
increased prospect for conflicts of the latter type and whether
the factors operating to impel eventual major power involvement
in conflicts between Nth powers will be as strong as are the forces
operating today to involve major power involvement in local conflicts.
The position that nuclear diffusion will increase the prospects for
independent local conflicts seems difficult to deny. As for the
likelihood of major power involvement in local conflicts, it seems
doubtful that this likelihood will be substantially affected in the
majority of instances by the possibility that nuclear weapons may
be employed by the parties immediately involved. This likelihood
arises not so much from the weapons employed (and particularly if
the Nth powers involved have a very modest nuclear force) as it
23. Ikle, op. cit., p. 391. And Ikle adds: "In other words,
Nth country capabilities might eigher help to deter local agression altogether or they might help to isolate local conflicts.n
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does from the more basic structural characteristics of the
Cold War and the seeming inability of the major powers to
refrain from eventually involving themselves in local
conflicts . 24

24. Even if it were to be conceded that nuclear diffusion
would operate to decrease the likelihood of major power involvement
in local conflicts, this diminished likelihood would still have to
be weighed against the prospect of increased conflict among the
Nth powers. Unless it can be shown that very compelling considera tions would militate against major power involvement in Nth country
conflicts, it would seem that the more reasonable conclusion is
that an increase in the prospects for local conflicts will carry
with i t the expectation of major power involvement in at least
some of these conflicts. In a word, the nstatistical theory"
appears more persuasive here than the argument which is based on
the operation of novel forces .
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CHAPTER VI
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
First: It is likely that nuclear diffusion will prove
destabilizing if for no other reason than it will present us
with a novel world, and a world which is, on the ~hole, substantially less secure than the present world. The acquisition
of nuclear weapons, it is true, may be expected to have a sobering effect upon nations. Nevertheless, any increase of prudence
may be more than offset by the actual insecurity many nations
will experience.
Second: In relation to the major powers, the position of
Nth countries will largely depend upon the nature and quality of
the weapons systems they are able to acquire. Those nations possessing a weapons system that can be entirely destroyed by a preemptive strike, or that can be readily destroyed by the active
defenses of a major power, would probably not enjoy a greater
degree of strategic independence and security. If anything they
are likely to be less secure in relation to a major power intent
on applying pressure ranging from subversion to the employment of
conventional forces.
On the other hand, an Nth country may well become considerably
more independent if it possesses a weapons system some small portion
of which could survive a pre-emptive strike by a major power--enough,
let us say, to destroy at least several cities of the major power.
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This result follows not only from the reluctance of a major
power to incur the risk of losing several cities by pushing
an Nth power too far, but also from the fear that during such
an exchange with an Nth country its major adversary--particularly
if it is allied to the Nth country--may be tempted to strike or
even feel compelled to strike. The "trigger" value of nuclear
weapons for an Nth country will of course depend on the size of
the trigger. Below a certain size the trigger may well prove to
be a liability rather than an asset, both in relation to a major
adversary as well as in relation to a major ally. But above a
certain size and quality, the trigger may turn into an asset of
considerable significance.
Finally, in relation to major powers, it is difficult to
see the advantage an Nth power would obtain by acquiring tactical
nuclear weapons, assuming that the area in which such weapons were
to be employed would in all probability be restricted to the territory of the Nth country.
Third: Whether nuclear diffusion raises the danger of socalled "catalytic war" depends, in the first place, on what one
has in mind when using the term. In one sense, the term has been
used to describe a situation in which an Nth power might deliberately precipitate a thermonuclear exchange between the major
powers by the simulation of an attack by one of these powers
against the other. The reality of this danger arising from
nuclear diffusion is increasingly discounted and, for reasons
elaborated in earlier pages, it is believed rightly so. In
another sense, however, the term catalytic war may be used to
describe a situation in which an Nth country, finding itself in
a desperate plight, deliberately strikes at a major nuclear power
and thereby precipitates a global thermonuclear war (though, once
again, the prospect that such a strike might lead to a central
thermonuclear war will depend in large measure on the size and
quality of the nuclear forces of the Nth country). Since this
danger would probably be greatest in a situation of armed conflict involving the Nth country, most writers prefer to speak of
nuclear conflict through "escalation" rather than through
"catalysis." While both of these descriptive terms are correct,
if the decisive element in this escalating process is the action
of the Nth country in initiating the use of nuclear weapons, it
has served the role of a catalytic agent in provoking thermonuclear conflict.
An estimate of the effect nuclear diffusion may have on the
prospects for catalytic war in this latter sense of the term
depends not only on the expected frequency of local conflicts
involving Nth countries, but also on the likelihood that such
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conflicts may turn into global thermonuclear war . The position
taken here is that nuclea~ diffusion will increase the likeli hood of local conflicts among Nth countries and that the possibility of major power involvement in such conflicts is likely
to remain about the same as is the possibility of major power
involvement today in local conflicts . If such conflicts as
occur between Nth countries can be effectively contained and
prevented from developing into a global war, it will not be
due--at least not primarily--to the noninvolvement of major
powers (out of fear that involvement in Nth country conflicts
has become too risky) but to the progress the major powers have
made in creating invulnerable forces and in resolving the problems of command and control over these forces . Even so , nuclear
diffusion will have a strategically destabilizing effect pri marily because it will increase the likelihood of military
instability at the less than strategic level and this insta bility, it is believed, must eventually have an effect at the
strategic level .
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